In this paper, we analyze the mean number E(n, d) of internal equilibria in a general dplayer n-strategy evolutionary game where the agents' payoffs are normally distributed. First, we give a computationally implementable formula for the general case. Next we characterize the asymptotic behavior of E(2, d), estimating its lower and upper bounds as d increases.
Introduction
Evolutionary game theory is the suitable mathematical framework whenever there is frequency dependent selection -the fitness of an individual does not only depend on its strategy, but also on the composition of the population in relation with (multiple) other strategies [MS82, HS98, Now06] .
The payoff from the games is interpreted as individual fitness, naturally leading to a dynamical approach. As in classical game theory with the Nash equilibrium [MB05, McL05] , the analysis of properties of equilibrium points in evolutionary game theory has been of special interest [MS82, BCV97, GT10] . Herein, equilibrium points of a dynamical system predict the composition of strategy frequencies where all the strategies have the same average fitness. Biologically, these points can predict a co-existence of different types in a population and the maintenance of polymorphism.
Recently, decent attention has been paid to both numerical and analytical studies of equilibrium points in random evolutionary games [GT10, HTG12] . The focus was on analyzing the probability of observing a certain number of equilibria if the payoff entries are randomly drawn. This probability allows one to predict the complexity of the interactions as the number of strategies and the number of players in the game increase, especially when the environments are unknown or changing rapidly over time [FH92, GRLD09] . Furthermore, these studies have paid substantial attention to the maximal number of equilibrium points, as knowing it is insightful, and historically it has been studied extensively, not only in classical and evolutionary game theory, but also in other fields such as population genetics [MS82, Kar80, VC88a, VC88b, KF70, VC88c, BCV93, BCV97, Alt10, GT10, HTG12]. However, as it deals with the concrete numbers of equilibrium points, the studies have needed to take a direct approach that consists in solving a system of polynomial equations, the degree of which increases with the number of players in a game. As such, the mathematical analysis was mostly restricted to evolutionary games with a small number of players, due to the impossibility of solving general polynomial equations of a high degree [Abe24, HTG12] .
In this paper, we ask instead the question: what is the mean or expected number of equilibria that one can observe if the payoff matrix entries of the game are randomly drawn? Knowing the mean number of equilibria not only gives important insights into the overall complexity of the interactions as the number of participating players in the game and the potential strategies the players can adopt are magnified. It also enables us to predict the boundaries of the concrete numbers of equilibrium points such as the maximal one as we show later on in the paper. By connecting to the theory of random polynomials [EK95] , we first provide an exact, computationally implementable, formula for the expected number of equilibria in a general multi-player multistrategy random games when the payoff entries are normally distributed. Secondly, we derive lower and upper bounds of such a formula for the case of two-player games and provide an explicit formula for the case of two-strategy games. Finally, numerical results are provided and discussed when there more players and strategies.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the models and methods: the replicator equation in evolution game theory and the random polynomial theory are summarized in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, respectively. The connection between them, which is the method of this paper, is described in Section 2.3. The main results of this paper are presented in Section 3, starting with two-strategy games in Section 3.1, then with two-player games in Section 3.2, and lastly, with the general case of games with arbitrary numbers of players and strategies in Section 3.3. We compare our results with related ones in the literature and discuss on future perspective in Section 4. Finally, some detailed computations are given in the Appendix.
Models and Methods

Evolutionary game theory and replicator dynamics
The classical approach to evolutionary games is replicator dynamics [TJ78, Zee80, HS98, SS83, Now06] , describing that whenever a strategy has a fitness larger the average fitness of the population, it is expected to spread. Formally, let us consider an infinitely large population with n strategies, numerated from 1 to n. They have frequencies x i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, respectively, satisfying that 0 ≤ x i ≤ 1 and n i=1 x i = 1. The interaction of the individuals in the population is in groups of d participants, that is, they play and obtain their fitness from d-player games. We consider here symmetrical games (e.g. the public goods and the common-pool resource game) in which the order of the participants is irrelevant. Let α (1 ≤ i 0 ≤ n) is the strategy of the focal player, and let i k (with 1 ≤ i k ≤ n and 1 ≤ k ≤ d − 1) be the strategy of the player in position k. These payoffs form a (d − 1)-dimensional payoff matrix [GT10] , denoted by Π, which satisfies that (because the game symmetry)
whenever {i 1 . . . , i d−1 } is a permeation of {i 1 . . . , i d−1 }. This means only the fraction of each strategy in the game matters.
The average payoff or fitness of the focal player is given by
By abuse of notation, let us denote α , where
, is the number of players using strategy i in {i 1 , . . . , i d−1 }. Hence, from Eq. (1), the fitness of strategy i 0 can be rewritten as follows
where
are the multinomial coefficients.
Now the replicator equations for games with n strategies can be written as follows [HS98, Sig10] 
where π = n k=1 x k π k is the average payoff of the population. The equilibrium points of the system are given by the points (x 1 , . . . , x n ) satisfying that the fitness of all strategies are the same.
That is, they are represented by solutions of the system of equations
Subtracting from each of the equations the term π n we obtain a system of n − 1 polynomials of
where β we obtain the following equation in terms of (y 1 , . . . , y n−1 ) that is equivalent to (6) 0≤k1,...,kn−1≤d−1,
As stated, the goal of this article is to compute the expected number of (internal) equilibria in a general n-strategy d-player random evolutionary game. That consists in computing the expected number of solutions (y 1 , . . . , y n−1 ) ∈ R + n−1 of the system of (n − 1) polynomials of degree (d − 1) in (7). Furthermore, herein our analysis focuses on the case where the payoff matrix entries have identically normal distributions. It is known that, even for n = 2 it is impossible to analytically solve the system whenever d > 5 [Abe24] , as seen in [HTG12] . Hence, it is not feasible to use this direct approach of analytically solving the system if one wants to deal with the games with a large number of players and with multiple strategies. In this work, we address this issue by connecting to the theory of random polynomials described in the following section.
Random polynomial theory
Keeping the form of Eq. (7) in mind, we consider a system of n − 1 random polynomials of
where a 
The following theorem is the starting point of the analysis of this paper.
Theorem 2.1. [EK95, Theorem 7.1] Let U be any measurable subset of R n−1 . Assume that the rows of A are iid multivariate normal random vectors with mean zero and covariance matrix C.
The expected number of real roots of the system of equations (9) that lie in the set U is given by
dt.
From random polynomial theory to evolutionary game theory
Let E(n, d) be the number of internal equilibria in a d−player random game with n strategies.
As has been shown in Section 2.1, E(n, d) is the same as the number of positive solutions of Equation (15). Suppose for now that all β i k1,...,kn are independent Gaussian distributions with mean 0 and variance 1, then for each i, β
random vectors with mean zero and covariance matrix C given by
Now we can apply Theorem 2.1 with a i k1,...,kn−1 = β i k1,...,kn−1
. We obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 2.2. The expected number of internal equilibria in a d-player n-strategy random game is
given by
Denote by L the matrix with entries
It has been shown that a d-player n-strategy game has at most (d − 1) n−1 isolated internal equilibria (and this bound is sharp) [HTG12] . We denote by p i , 1 ≤ i ≤ (d−1) n−1 , the probability that the game has exactly i such equilibria. Then E(n, d) can also be defined through p i as follows
3 Results
We start with the case where there are two strategies (n = 2), analytically deriving the upper and lower bounds for E(2, d). Next we derive exact results for games with two players (d = 2).
Finally, we provide numerical results and discussion for the general case with arbitrary number of players and strategies. We start by considering that the coefficients β i k1,...,kn are standard normal distributions, and at the end show that the results do not change if these are arbitrary normal distributions 1 .
Multi-player two-strategy games
We first consider games with arbitrary number of players, but having only two strategies, i.e. n = 2. In this case, Eq. (7) is simplified to the following univariate polynomial equation of degree
The following lemma provides a formula for E(2, d).
Lemma 3.1. Assume that β k are independent Gaussian distributions with variance 1 and mean 0. Then the number of internal equilibria, E(2, d), in a d−player random game with two strategies is given by
Proof. Since β k has Gaussian distribution with variance 1 and mean 0,
and mean 0. According to Lemma 2.2, the equality (16) holds with
where the vector v and the matrix C (covariance matrix) are given by
A straightforward calculation gives
Substituting this expression into (18), we obtain (17).
Example 3.1. For the cases d = 2 and d = 3, we have
The following proposition presents some properties of the density function f (t).
Proposition 3.2. The following properties hold 1)
2 , where
Proof. 1) Set
we can transform
Therefore,
For the detailed computations of a k and the proof of (22), see Appendix 5.1.
2) The value of f (0) is found directly from (20). For the detailed computations of f (1), see
Appendix 5.2.
3) It follows from (24) that
where is derivative w.r.t t. Hence
contains only even powers of t with positive coefficients, all of its roots are purely imaginary. Suppose that
where r i > 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d − 1. It follows that
and hence
Since r i > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , d − 1, the above equality implies that f (t) is decreasing in t ∈ [0, ∞).
5) Set
It follows from the symmetric properties of the binomial coefficients that
Similarly, from (22) we have
6) By change of variable, s = 1 t , and from 3), we have
Remark 3.3. We provide an alternative proof of the fifth property in the above lemma in Appendix 5.3.
Remark 3.4. Besides enabling a significantly less complex numerical computation of E(2, d) (see already our numerical results using this formula in Table 1 ), the equality (23) reveals an interesting property: the expected number of zeros of the polynomial P (y) in two intervals (0, 1) and (1, ∞] are the same. Equivalently, the expected numbers of internal equilibria in two interval (0, 
Proof. Since f (t) is decreasing, we have f (0) ≥ f (t) ≥ f (1) for t ∈ [0, 1]. As a consequence,
To obtain the upper bound, we proceed as follows.
Note that if ab = 1, then 1 a + 1 + 1
We observe that if z is a zero of
This implies that the sequence {r i , i = 1, . . . , d − 1} can be grouped into
2 pairs of the form a, 1 a . Using (29), we obtain 1
For the second term, since cot −1 (z) ≤ π 2 for all z ≥ 0, we have
where we have used the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality
and the fact that From (28), (30) and (31), we have
In Figure 1a , we show the numerical results for E(d) in comparison with the obtained upper and lower bounds. 
2) The probability p m of observing m equilibria, 1 ≤ m ≤ d − 1, is bounded by
In particular,
, and lim
Proof. 1) This is a direct consequence of (27), as the lower bound of E(2, d) tends to infinity when d tends to infinity.
2) This is again a direct consequence of (27) and definition of E(2, d).
we have
As a consequence, lim
Similarly, we can show that this limit is actually true for p k
From this corollary we can see that, interestingly, although the mean number of equilibria tends to infinity when the number of players d increases, the probability to see the maximal number of equilibria in a d-player system converges to 0. There has been extensive research studying the maximal number of equilibrium points of a system [MS82, Kar80, VC88a, VC88b, KF70, VC88c, BCV93, BCV97, Alt10]. Our results suggest that the possibility to reach such a maximal number is very small when d is sufficiently large.
Two-player multi-strategy games
In this section, we consider games with two players, i.e. d = 2, and arbitrary strategies. In this case (7) is simplified to a linear system
where β i j have Gaussian distributions with mean 0 and variance 1. The main result of this section is the following explicit formula for E(n, 2).
Theorem 3.7. We have E(n, 2) = 1 2 n−1 .
Proof. According to Lemma 2.2, we have
where L is the matrix with entries
The determinant of L is computed in the following auxiliary lemma whose proof is given in the Appendix 5.4.
Lemma 3.8. It holds that
We continue with the computation of E(n, 2).
where we have repeatedly used the equality (with a > 0 and p > 1)
As a corollary we recover the following result obtained in [HTG12, Theorem 1].
Corollary 3.9. In a random two-player game with n strategies, the probability that there exists a (unique) isolated internal equilibrium is 2 1−n .
Multi-player multi-strategy games
We now move to the general case of multi-player games with multiple strategies. We provide numerical results for this case. where S = {1, . . . , n − 1} and R = {i 1 , . . . , i m }.
According to Lemma 2.2, the expected number of internal equilibria in a d−player random game with n strategies is given by
where Γ is the Gamma function, and L denotes the matrix with entries
We have
So far in the paper we assume that all the β i k1,...,kn−1 in Eq. (7) are standard normal distributions. The following lemma shows, as a consequence of the above described formula, that all the results obtained so far remain valid if they have a normal distribution with mean zero and arbitrary variance (i.e. the entries of the game payoff matrix have a same, arbitrary normal distribution). 
Repeating the same calculation we obtain the same L ij as in (38), which is independent of σ.
This result suggests that when dealing with random games as in this article, it is sufficient to consider that payoff entries are from interval [0, 1] instead off from an arbitrary one, as done numerically in [GT10] . A similar behaviour has been observed in [HTG12] for the analysis and computation with small d or n, showing that results are not dependent on the interval where the payoff entries are drawn.
Example 3.2 (d-players with n=3 strategies).
Next we provide some numerical results. We numerically compute E(n, d) for n ∈ {2, 3, 4}, d ≤ 20, and show them in Table 1 and Figure 1b . We also plot the lower and upper bound for E(2, d) obtained in Theorem 3.5 and compare them with its numerical computation, see Figure 1a . We note that for small n and d (namely, n ≤ 5 and d ≤ 4), E(n, d) can also be computed numerically via the probabilities p i of observing exactly i equilibria using (14). This direct approach have been used in [HTG12] and [GT10] , and our results are compatible. ). An interesting implication of these results is that although the expected number of equilibria tends to infinity when d increases, the probability to see the maximal possible number of equilibria tends to 0. This is an notable observation since knowing the maximal number of equilibrium points in an evolutionary process is insightful and has been of special focus in biological contexts [Lev00, GT10] . Furthermore, for d = 2 with an arbitrary n, we have derived the exact value E(n, 2) = 2 1−n , recovering results obtained in [HTG12] . In the general case, based on the formula provided we have been able to numerically calculate E(n, d), thereby lifting the analytical and numerical computations from previous work that made use of the direct approach.
On the other side, the study of distribution of zeros of system of random polynomials as described in (8) 
is no longer a generating function. Whether one can find a compact or asymptotic formula for E(2, d) is unclear. For the multivariate situation, the exact formula for E(n, 2) is interesting by itself and we could not be able to find it in the literature. Due to the complexity in the general case d, n ≥ 3, further research is required.
In short, we have described a novel approach to calculating and analyzing the (expected) number of equilibrium points in a general random evolutionary game, giving insights into the overall complexity of such dynamical system as the players and the strategies in the game increase.
Since the theory of random polynomials is rich, we envisage that our method could be extended to obtain results for other more complex scenarios such as games having a payoff matrix with dependent entries and/or with general distributions.
Appendix
Properties of a k
In the following we prove that a 2d−4−k = a k for all 0 ≤ k ≤ 2d − 4. Indeed, 
it follows that a 2d−4−k = a k for all 0 ≤ k ≤ 2d − 4.
Detailed computation of f (1)
We use the following identities involving the square of binomial coefficients.
Therefore, we have
where we have used the identity 2(n + 1) n + 1 = n + 1 2(2n + 1) 2n n .
Proof of Lemma 3.8
Denoting Σ = 1 + 
